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Introduction 
 
How far can consistent assessment capture all the worthwhile features of 
educational achievement? Are some important components of learning necessarily 
open to a range of potentially inconsistent judgments by different assessors? In this 
paper I develop a cautiously affirmative answer to the second question,  hedging it 
about with a number of qualifications. 
These issues are related to the familiar tension between reliability and validity. 
It is widely discussed (Gipps 1999, Isaacston 1999, Nystrom 2004), with a long 
history in the literature, going back at least to Cronbach 1960). Moreover, many 
commentators note that whether it is a problem depends on assessment purposes. 
‘High stakes’ assessment prevails in many developed countries, with major effects on 
the lives of students, teachers and educational institutions. For such assessment, 
excellent levels of reliability must be expected, though putting a figure on this is 
problematic and contestable. Perfect reliability is impossible. So what level is 
necessary? Arguably there is no definitive answer. We are always challenged to 
weigh the consequences of assessment for a given purpose against ‘costs’ to its 
validity. 
There are a number of ways of viewing consistency or reliability in 
assessment. My broad focus here is on reliability construed as levels of agreement 
between different assessors. For example, the reliability of a written test is the extent 
to which several examiners marking ‘blind’ would come up with similar scores for 
given pupils. 
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 Empirical research (Harlen 2004)  indicates that closely specified 
achievements are more likely to be measurable with high degrees of reliability than 
those characterised more loosely.  For instance, a test of whether someone can run 
100 metres in under a specified time can have a very high level of reliability; the 
timing device, what counts as finishing the 100 metres and so forth can be laid down 
in great detail, ensuring that different assessors will arrive at the same verdict. 
Suppose it turns out that at least some aspects of ‘important’ educational 
achievement cannot be appraised consistently. A high stakes system with at least half 
an eye on reliability is unlikely even to attempt to deal with them. This may be why 
Speaking and Listening is not assessed  in the UK National Curriculum English tests 
though I cannot offer evidence for such a speculation. Moreover, a familiar theme 
from empirical research is that  teachers devote less time and efforts to  untested 
learning outcomes.  It is supported by Harlen 2004 in a research review of a large 
number of studies. (For discussion of this issue see Wiliam 2003). 
Some commentators may concede that a proportion of significant 
achievements are ignored in very reliable systems but that the benefits of high stakes 
assessment make this worthwhile. The plausibility of their verdicts will depend in part 
on their justification for prioritising certain aspects of educational achievement over 
others. I return to this issue at the end of the paper. 
 
Inconsistency as a defect 
 
 The main part of the paper examines whether inconsistency must be regarded 
as a defect in all cases in the context of educational assessment. However, I  first 
briefly examine two contexts where inconsistency obviously is a problem. Often 
enough, the very fact that verdicts are not consistent with each other implies that they 
do not deserve to be taken seriously. An appreciation of why this is the case will help 
us understand later whether some cases of inconsistency within educational 
assessment might prove to be exceptions to this rule. 
 
(1) Natural Science 
 
In natural sciences such as physics and chemistry, results are expected to be replicable 
by any researcher. If not, they are discredited, or an explanation is required within the 
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terms of the relevant scientific theory to account for the discrepancies. If a scientist 
wants to say something true and objective about the size of a planetary body, an 
object’s velocity, the voltage in a wire or what happens when iron filings are added to 
sulphuric acid, then it should be clear how the claims are supported. Moreover, 
anyone with appropriate skills, resources and instruments should be able to produce 
the same results. Without this there is nothing of significance, let alone anything 
approaching a truth value. 
 
(b) Normative judgements understood to be mere expressions of feelings. 
 
It is a commonplace that people frequently disagree when making value 
judgments. Many philosophers have urged that value judgements are ‘mere’ 
expressions of feeling, David Hume being just one representative of this long 
tradition. If he is right, then  value disagreement is a symptom of the fact that we 
project our sentiments on a world whose fabric lacks value in principle. Of course, the 
sharpness of value disagreement in  a Humean universe might sometimes be blunted 
by socialisation.  Be that as it may, Shaper-Landau comments:- 
 ‘If moral facts were reports of ‘objective’ states of affairs, then we should 
expect in morality the breadth of convergence that emerges in some of the more 
rigorous empirical and theoretical disciplines.’ ( Russ Shaper-Landau 1994 p.331)  
 
Inconsistency not linked to the absence of significance 
 
In the light of these two examples I now critically  examine in turn each of 
three arguments that significance is not inextricably linked to the consistency of 
educational assessment.  
Some verdicts in educational assessment contexts are purely factual. Here are 
three instances. The student’s answer to question 10 was incorrect. The student only 
wrote 1200 words when the expected length of the essay was 5000. The student 
spelled 20 words incorrectly on his first page. I will assume without argument that 
inconsistency about these kinds of verdicts is obviously a problem, and that any 
satisfactory educational assessment process will seek to avoid it. 
However, many components of educational assessment are normative. For 
example, an undergraduate essay might be said to  show imagination, high levels of 
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critical reflection or cogently developed argument. It is with the normative elements 
that the following discussion is largely concerned.  
 
 
Aesthetic judgments 
 
 The first argument for the possibility of legitimately combining significance 
with inconsistency may be summarised as follows: Some assessments resemble 
aesthetic judgments and  significance in aesthetic judgments is not necessarily and 
comprehensively linked to consistency. So just how is this possible? 
 Clearly there are widespread disagreements between those appraising art, 
musical performances, dance, and literature. Of course, subjectivists  insist that 
judgments about beauty, elegance, grace and the rest  ‘merely’ reflect  feelings and 
that this accounts for the range of verdicts. On this view there is no significance here 
beyond strong feelings. Given such a perspective, many would oppose relating any 
educational assessments to aesthetic judgments. Educational assessment surely must  
transcend mere expression of  feelings, or so they would argue. 
Subjectivism about aesthetic judgments denies  the very legitimacy of Kant’s 
‘judgements of taste’. These aspire to universal validity.  
 
….he says that the thing is beautiful; and it is not as if he counts on 
others agreeing with him in his judgment of liking owing to his having 
found them in such agreement on a number of occasions, but he 
demands this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge 
differently, and denies them taste, which he still requires of them as 
something they ought to have; and to this extent it is not open to men 
to say: Every one has his own taste. This would be equivalent to 
saying that there is no such thing as taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgment 
capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men. 
 
Kant 1928 p 52 
 
One  relatively weak counter to those dismissing subjectivism would be to 
accept the subjectivist story both for aesthetics and certain instances of educational 
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assessment, but to contend that the very existence of  varied feelings  is important. 
Hence an assessment regime which sidelines them is open to question. This move 
needs a little more explanation. 
 Suppose assessors drawn from a particular culture assess student achievement 
according to criteria such as ‘level of insight’, ‘interpretive skills’ and ‘quality of 
critical reflection’. For the sake of argument, let us accord them appropriate levels of 
subject knowledge, professional experience and acquaintance with assessment 
processes. If the group work together over a period of time a reasonable consensus on 
verdicts should be perfectly possible, and indeed is a matter of common experience. 
Yet, given the criteria concerned, should we not expect a range of responses to at least 
some aspects of the student achievements concerned? Of course, a proportion of this 
disagreement will stem from everyday human failings. Assessors may be tired, 
irrationally swayed by the handwriting or the font size of the scripts, and so on. But in 
addition to this, some assessors will just feel differently from others about certain 
aspects of student performance. These feelings should not be ignored. This is how a 
subjectivist construal might run. 
 However, as I have already conceded, subjectivism about aesthetic judgments 
is a weak response. Moreover, from such a viewpoint, a claimed analogy with 
educational assessment is less than easy to swallow. Why should anyone care about 
examiners’ feelings, if that is all they are?  Consider just three possible uses to which 
assessment may be put: to inform teachers’ decisions about what next to offer their 
students, to help select students for educational courses and to support employers who 
wish to make suitable appointments. The mere feelings of examiners should not play a 
substantial role in the fulfilling of these kinds of assessment purposes. To conclude,  if 
a plausible case is to be made for a parallel between some aesthetic judgments and 
certain educational assessment verdicts, a crude subjectivism must be rejected. 
 A more robust approach to aesthetic judgments would point up the complexity 
and richness of aesthetic disputes and  argue that they cannot be located entirely 
within the realm of ‘mere feeling’. A disagreement about whether a mathematical 
proof is ‘elegant’ might stem from differing views of proof itself – some favouring an 
algebraic approach and others taking especial delight in the use of visual 
representations of various kinds. A range of verdicts about whether the performance 
of a baroque violin sonata was ‘expressive’ might reflect a diversity of approaches to 
the ‘meaning’ of the piece. One assessor might pay much attention to what the 
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composer intended, as far as evidence could be gathered, another could attempt to 
interpret the piece in the context of the particular cultural setting in which it first 
emerged while yet another focused on the music as a conveyer of meaning to the 
listener in the 21
st
 century. This scenario does not assume that aesthetic appraisals fall 
neatly into just one of these three categories, nor that the categories exhaust the 
possibilities. Many appraisers will draw on complex hybrids of these and other 
approaches.  
 Scruton 1997 explains one feature of the complexities pervading aesthetic 
judgment in terms of ‘aspect perception’. He attributes this idea to Wollheim 1987, 
who calls it ‘representational seeing’. When we see one thing in another, such as 
seeing a face in a picture (which itself is not a picture of a face) we have an instance 
of such aspect perception. Sometimes we entertain the idea that there is, for instance, 
a man in a picture. We need not be thinking that there is a man there; we may be 
restricted to an imaginative involvement. In his discussion, Scruton refers to 
ambiguous figures; many readers will associate these with Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
‘seeing as’ in Philosophical Investigations and his examples of the schematic cube 
and the duck-rabbit (Wittgenstein 1958). Such complexities open up the possibility of 
legitimately inconsistent judgments about the situations concerned. 
 Even if these examples from aesthetics are understood and accepted, it is, of 
course, a substantial further step to claim that such approaches are ever applicable in 
educational assessment contexts. However, in Higher Education and in many school 
subjects, assessors will be judging features such as critical thinking, imagination and 
analysis. Criteria for writing tasks included in English tests for 11 year olds included 
‘Length and focus of sentences varied to express subtleties in meaning and to focus on 
key ideas,’ ‘All aspects of the story are consistent and contribute to overall impact’ 
and ‘Viewpoint well-controlled, eg selection of detail to encourage reader to 
sympathize with the explorer; action portrayed from different viewpoints.’ (QCA 
2006) The descriptors here were littered with normative and even aesthetic 
components. 
 ‘Aspect perception’ seems a rich and powerful idea to play with in this 
connection. Yet any attempt to liken verdicts about these achievements to aesthetic 
appraisals may provoke a negative reaction. The relevant assessments are supposed to 
be far removed from judgments about paintings, for instance, where, despite the 
importance of cognitive expertise, the role of the personal response is central and 
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entirely appropriate. If, for instance, university examining resembles the proceedings 
of art critics, then it is time for the process to be shaken up, to be made more 
‘transparent’, open to external scrutiny and generally to be ‘professionalised’. Or so it 
might be argued. 
If the hostility to the comparison with aesthetic verdicts stems mainly from 
indignation about the very possibility of inconsistency, it might well be possible to 
exclude such inconsistency. For, within a particular society, a level of consensus can 
develop about the quality of novels, paintings, compositions and other expressions of 
the creative arts and, as we have already noted, assessors can develop a shared culture 
within which convergence of verdicts might be achieved.  
Although this is perfectly possible, any attempt to ensure high levels of 
consensus in the arts arguably damages something at their very heart. It is no accident, 
no peripheral inconvenience, that the history of Western Art music includes the 
rejection of tonality by Schoenberg and the Second Viennese School and that 
Messiaen
1
 fails to follow the canons of sonata development and the sense of 
progression over time which are central to the classical compositions of Haydn and 
Mozart. When these events occurred they were highly controversial and perhaps still 
are. Those making aesthetic appraisals of such works of Western Art Music will not 
achieve convergence in judgment. A sophisticated treatment of issues in the 
philosophy of music is beyond the scope of this paper. All that can be said here is that 
some judgments about whether, for instance  a piece of music ‘has a proper sense of 
direction’ or  ‘develops appropriate tensions and satisfying resolutions of these’ will 
involve making assumptions about the extent to which music must present, in any 
sense, a narrative over time. These assumptions will not and arguably should not be 
required to be shared universally by those reaching verdicts about quality in this area. 
Were musical developments to have been subject to a requirement that they 
evoked a consistent response from appropriately qualified judges, then many events 
crucial to the continued flourishing of musical culture could not have taken place. It 
would have been, in effect, to have erected a barrier between the appraisers and the 
essence of that which they were appraising. 
Again, those reluctant  to compare educational assessment to aesthetic 
judgment are likely to throw up their hands in disgust. They will say that any idea that 
the kinds of judgments involved in educational assessment could be subject to the 
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kind of revolution and radical subversion  resembling  paradigm shifts in the arts 
would be patently absurd. 
This rejection of the analogy with aesthetic judgment arguably misses the 
point. It is not being suggested that continuous or even occasional revolution would 
be a good thing within the processes of educational assessment. At the same time, 
paradigm shifts in the arts are an extreme instance of something fundamental to their 
existence: the continuing possibility of value and significance that is independent of 
practices and sets of criteria developed by particular communities and cultures. The 
question under consideration is whether this idea is relevant to the status of at least 
some normative judgments in educational assessment. 
 Many involved in assessment have encountered cases which seem to relate to 
this point. Unusual and sometimes gifted pupils write essays or offer other products 
which cannot be properly graded according to the criteria laid down. Yet markers may 
claim to discern very real value. Not infrequently in these kinds of situations, markers 
disagree sharply, with one party identifying outstanding qualities, while others may 
feel that the assignment should fail. Sometimes the rules can be bent, and the student 
emerges with a high score, arguably appropriate to the quality of their work. On many 
other occasions, the system wins, and the student may receive a poor grade. Often 
enough the system agrees to ‘split the difference’, with the result that a potentially 
outstanding student gains a mediocre verdict. Although this situation will strike many 
as unsatisfactory, as we have already noted, we need to know the uses to which the 
assessment results will be put before deciding just how seriously we should take such 
problems. 
 I have not succeeded in establishing beyond doubt that some legitimate 
judgments in educational assessment resemble some aesthetic appraisals, and that 
because the latter are not comprehensively tied to consistency in judgments neither 
should the former be so tied. Moreover, we would still need to debate the relative 
importance of that potentially excluded by prioritising consistency. Nevertheless I 
suggest that  enough has been said to justify taking the analogy with aesthetics 
seriously. 
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Holism and particularism in normative judgments 
 
 I now examine a second argument for the possibility of combining a degree of  
inconsistency with ‘significance’. This argument stems from a type of holism about 
some assessment criteria.  
One supposedly rigorous approach to assessment  is  sometimes known as 
using weighted criteria. A mark scheme specifies maximum marks under a range of 
headings, such as cogency of argument, clarity of expression, critical reflection,  
appropriate use of relevant literature, accuracy in the use of scholarly conventions and 
standard of written English. These exemplar headings might fit essays in the 
humanities; evidently assignments of other kinds in different subject areas would 
attract distinctive criteria. 
The apparent virtues of this way of proceeding are obvious. Markers have a 
clear framework within which they can work. When discussing assessment with each 
other they have common guidelines; a developing consensus and consistency of 
verdicts seem very likely outcomes. 
 Yet it can be argued that there are serious theoretical problems here, at least 
within some  subject areas, especially the humanities and social sciences. The 
meaning and significance of many of these criteria cannot be separated from that of 
their bedfellows. For instance, what counts as cogency of argument depends at least in 
part on what counts as clarity of expression, which, in turn, cannot easily be separated 
from standard of written English. Many of the criteria cannot be considered and 
assessed  on their own. How they are applied depends on how related criteria are 
applied, and vice versa. There is a kind of hermeneutic circle here. We cannot 
understand any one criterion unless we understand others and how that one relates to 
the others. Yet, in turn, we cannot understand any one of the others either without 
understanding the rest and how they fit together.  
There is no need to exaggerate the position to make the basic point. We must, 
for instance, concede that some criteria are more ‘atomic’ then others. If we are 
awarding marks for spelling standards then these can be isolated from any marks we 
might award for critical reflection. (Though even this might be challenged in an 
extreme case. If the spelling is so appalling that the writing is almost impossible to 
follow then marks for critical reflection are hardly going to be readily available.)  
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Be that as it may, many of the key criteria used to judge an essay in English 
literature, history or philosophy are interrelated. A very similar story could be told for 
hosts of other assessment examples. What, then are the implications for  the strength 
of the link between consistency and educational significance in assessment? 
 Perhaps it is possible for assessors to reach agreement with each other over a 
period of time about this kind of criteria jigsaw – about how the different elements 
should be seen as relating to each other when marking the essays in question. My 
concern about this is as follows. Might there be a cost to securing such an agreement? 
Might some features of the essay be ignored? For instance, when reaching a verdict 
about the quality of critical reflection, if we insist that this criterion is related in 
specific ways to others such as cogency of argument, are we confining ourselves to 
scrutinising the essay in one particular way and excluding other perfectly legitimate 
approaches? Are we, so to speak, seeing the assignment as illuminated by a particular 
kind of lighting when, if we were allowed different lighting, other aspects might 
become visible? 
 It is illuminating to relate this debate to issues that have arisen over the last 
two or three decades around the approach to meta-ethics known as moral 
particularism – a debate associated especially with Jonathan Dancy and John 
McDowell. When considering reasons favouring one action rather than another, for 
instance, Dancy claims that: 
‘1. A feature or part may have one value in one context and a different 
or opposite value in another. 
 2. The value of a complex or whole is not necessarily identical with 
the sum of the values of its elements or parts.’ (Dancy 2000, p 139) 
 
 Examples are contested by those opposed to particularism, but here are two 
simply to illustrate the type of thesis Dancy supports. The fact that an action results in 
pleasure can make it better in some circumstances and worse in others. Suppose a 
possible action of mine results in letting people watch hangings. If the people get 
pleasure from the spectacle then (it might be claimed ) my action is morally worse 
than it otherwise would have been. A second case: ‘That one of the candidates wants 
the job very much indeed is sometimes a reason for giving it to her and sometimes a 
reason for doing the opposite’. (Dancy 2000 p 132-3). 
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 We need not be in a position to pronounce definitively on the philosophical 
strengths and weaknesses of moral particularism in order to draw some parallels with 
assessment contexts. Irony in an essay about certain postmodern postures might be a 
strength: that irony in a critical discussion of Frege on sense and reference could be 
wholly out of place and provide a reason for a lower mark than would otherwise have 
been earned. Rich imagery and metaphor might enhance a discussion of Keat’s 
poetry, but could well detract from the quality of an analysis of the German economy 
between the two World Wars. One explanation for this ‘particularism’ lies in the 
holism and the ‘hermeneutic circle’ referred to above in the context of the discussion 
of weighted criteria. The weight and significance of irony, for instance simply cannot 
be appraised outside the context of the writing in which it occurs; its role and 
contribution depends crucially on other features of the assignment in question. 
Arguably, there can be legitimate disagreement about the contribution of such 
features to the overall quality of the essay. If we insist on excluding such 
disagreement in order to achieve the requisite levels of reliability and to make the 
assessment process ‘work’, are  we then able to examine all the significant features of 
the student products or achievements concerned? I suggest that this question deserves 
serious consideration. 
 
Incomparability and incommensurability 
 
 The third argument for the possibility of combining inconsistency with 
significance draws on concepts of incommensurability. Isaiah Berlin defends a 
pluralism of values, as opposed to a monism according to which we can order, 
compare and contrast values within some kind of overall theory. ‘..human goals are 
many, not all of them commensurable..To assume that all values can be graded on one 
scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to 
falsify our knowledge that men are free agents..’  ( Berlin 1969 p 171) 
Could a measure of disagreement between assessors stem from attempts to 
compare  at least some features which are inherently resistant to comparison? If, for 
instance people are asked to compare the Taj Mahal with the Sydney Opera House 
there will be a range of reactions. These will include sheer bewilderment, verdicts 
favouring the Opera House, verdicts according the two buildings the same value and 
judgments on the side of the Taj Mahal. The diversity of responses in itself proves 
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nothing. However, it might well be symptomatic of the fact that people think that in 
such examples comparisons are odious. Similarly, they may feel that a Mozart Opera 
ought not to be compared with  a Coldplay item, and Jane Austen’s novel Emma 
ought not to be weighed against Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings. 
 Note, however, that the opening formulation above speaks  cautiously of at 
least some features that should not be compared. If we are determined to do so, we 
can find  ‘covering values’ (Chang 1997) against which the items could be compared, 
at least in theory. We cannot compare Emma with Lord of the Rings in respect of their 
respective depictions of the nouveaux riche or the verbal painting of landscape, but 
perhaps we can make more progress if we consider them under the heading ‘Worth of 
literature dealing with moral themes’. Would this move allow sensible comparisons to 
be made after all? 
 It may be objected that we cannot compare the value of the treatment of the 
nouveaux riche in Emma and in the Lord of the Rings  because, obviously, only Emma 
attempts it. Similarly, Tolkien achieves (with consummate skill and artistry) the 
verbal painting of landscape, while Jane Austen is otherwise employed.  What is 
needed for the argument that comparisons are genuinely odious, are features which 
are in a sense common to both works yet where comparability is clearly open to 
question. It is true that both works deal with morality. Yet, arguably, Tolkien’s epic 
portrayal in a fantasy world of the struggle of good against evil should not be 
considered alongside Jane Austen’s subtle and gently ironic treatment of Emma’s 
moral failings. Superficially, we have found a covering value. However, the works are 
simply not doing the same kind of thing here – and insisting that we must reach a 
verdict on which work does this ‘better’ seems to involve a fundamental distortion of 
the distinctive qualities to be found in each work. 
 I suggest that in our reactions to these examples, we are grappling with 
incommensurability. Lukes 1997 explains this as existing where it would be 
‘inappropriate’ to make  comparisons although they would not necessarily be 
unintelligible or meaningless. So, although a comparison need not be incoherent, we 
nevertheless hold back from making one; ‘we do sometimes refuse to commensurate 
or compare alternatives’ … ‘such a refusal can display our understanding of what is 
involved in certain relationships..’ (Lukes ibid) 
To set Lukes’s views in context, we need to compare and contrast them with 
other recent treatments of incomparability and incommensurability. For instance, John 
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Broome (2001) thinks of incommensurability as involving alternatives which realize 
such different values that  
 
‘it is impossible to weigh them against each other precisely….When 
values are incommensurable, it may not be determinate which of the 
two alternatives is better. It may be that neither is better than the other, 
yet we also cannot say they are equally good.’ 
 
Broome 2001 p 12 
 
He goes on to illustrate incommensurability in this sense with the example of 
God telling Abraham to sacrifice his son, claiming that submitting to God’s will 
cannot be weighed against saving Isaac.  
Compare this treatment with Chang’s (2002), who argues that the failure of 
the trichotomy of possible relations between A and B – that A is neither better nor 
worse than B and that A and B are not equally good does not prevent them being what 
she calls ‘on a par’ – they could still in some sense be comparable. She dubs those 
prepared to countenance a fourth relation between A and B ‘tetrachotomists’, 
observing that ‘the tetrachotomist thinks that even if one item is neither better nor 
worse than another and that the items are not equally good, there may nevertheless be 
an evaluative difference between them..’ ( p. 664) Even if she is right about, this we 
are now contemplating comparability of a radically different kind from that in which 
we can compare A and B according to any kind of common measure. 
I suggest that one of the reasons for our refusal to rank certain items on a 
common scale is our awareness of the distinctive quality of the features concerned. It 
is not a global rejection of ranking procedures, nor of the possibility of covering 
values in even the majority of cases.  It is rather the appreciation that  some aspects of 
morality and of works of art resist ordering on a scale in terms of a common value. 
This is not the claim that ‘distinctiveness’ is a sufficient condition for  significant 
value. It is the much more modest contention that it is a necessary feature of some 
kinds of significant value. 
We must be cautious about how we deal with incomparability here. Crowder 
1998 argues that if values could not be compared then we could not make 
comparative judgments about them in particular cases. Yet it is part of our moral 
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experience to succeed in doing just this, or so Crowder contends. He seems to be right 
about this; even if we cannot explicitly codify how we weigh, for instance the 
importance of a heart operation against an expensive drug for the treatment of 
schizophrenia, we constantly do make such decisions, and would hope that many of 
them are not just arbitrary. 
There are yet other conceptions of incommensurability in recent philosophical 
literature. I briefly draw attention to just one more  here. Incommensurability may be 
seen as involving the possibility of disagreement even given reasonable reflection – 
‘Incommensurability marks a practical limit on the power of reason alone to decide 
value conflicts’ (Plaw 2004 p 113) As stated, this is compatible with a Humean 
approach to normativity but Plaw likens political judgments involving 
incommensurability in this sense to aesthetic judgments and he clearly does not think 
of the latter as merely subjective. 
Suppose, then, that our understanding of selected values shows itself in an 
appreciation that we ought not to weigh them against each other on any kind of 
common scale. (I certainly cannot claim to have established this here – but would 
contend that the examples cited at least hint at this possibility.) I suggested at the 
beginning of the section that a proportion of disagreements between appraisers could 
be symptomatic of an insight (whether conscious or otherwise) that they are being 
asked to weigh features against each other on a common scale, features which should 
not be so weighed.  The ‘training’ of relevant assessors to improve consistency in 
judgments, to strengthen the  reliability of the process will tend to exclude the 
consideration of  qualities with ‘incommensurability’ aspects. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 The approach in this paper has been deliberately cautious and tentative. I have 
considered three arguments for the claim that significant components of educational 
achievement cannot be captured by a highly reliable assessment system. I have 
concluded that these arguments should be taken seriously, even if they are not 
conclusive. 
Those hostile to comparisons between aesthetic judgment and educational 
assessment would have a short way with all this. They could concede that we might 
offer a faint nod in the direction of incommensurability when dealing with arcane 
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aesthetic or value issues, but  urge that in the everyday business of educational 
assessment we  should ignore it.  
 However, surely we should worry if reliability seems to exclude some kinds 
of value.  Admittedly, the potential losses seem less salient in some subject areas and 
at some levels. Yet, whenever there are evaluative elements in assessment, and 
arguably there usually are, concerns about potential losses are not easily dispelled. 
Ultimately, however, the seriousness of all this can only be judged in the light of our 
educational aims. For instance, those with thin instrumental objectives for education 
seem unlikely to be troubled by the arguments presented here. In  the light of their 
aspirations for education, they will argue that the advantages of a suitably reliable 
high stakes assessment system outweigh the disadvantages. Nevertheless I have urged 
elsewhere (Davis 1998) that such advantages are greatly overrated, even given the 
assumption that education should support modern industrial economies. There is no 
scope in this paper to rehearse these considerations. 
Those sufficiently exercised by my arguments may still wonder what practical 
steps could be taken as a result to modify testing and examination systems. I suggest 
that responses can only be given on a case by case basis, having regard to the 
purposes of the assessments concerned.  
In Higher Education there is,  arguably, a case for allowing inconsistent 
verdicts to stand on occasion, and for allowing particular weight to be given to very 
positive verdicts from particular assessors, even if others disagree. The strength of this 
case will vary from subject to subject and will also depend on the nature of the student 
assignment or examination. Examples in mathematics and science seem less likely, 
though I would not rule them out. The humanities and social sciences might well 
provide a rich mine of cases.  Of course, universities implementing such a policy 
might encounter difficulties which would include a greater likelihood of student 
appeals. They would have to be very convinced of my concerns to risk this and I am 
not optimistic that I could persuade them. 
Another way of scrutinising how we deal in practical terms with the 
implications of legitimate inconsistency is this: awareness of the very possibility may 
change some of the ways we decide to use assessment in the first place, depending as 
always on what we think education is actually for. The example noted early in the 
paper of English tests for 11 year olds is an important one to consider – and countless 
others could be cited. The ‘backwash’ of high stakes testing is an acknowledged 
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phenomenon. If some features of children’s writing cannot be reliably assessed, then 
they will not be assessed. Teachers will know that they are not, and their approaches 
to teaching and the curriculum will be influenced accordingly. One obvious way out 
of this problem is to stop, at a stroke, the high stakes uses to which these tests are 
being put.  
I will give the last word to Bernard Williams. He notes that ‘if there are many 
and competing genuine values, then the greater extent to which a society tends to be 
single-valued, the more genuine values it neglects or suppresses’. (Williams 1980) 
  
 
Notes 
 
1. ‘Where a conventional Western composition will seem to unfold as a thread 
through time, Messiaen’s discontinuous music rather provides an environment 
within which time itself can be observed, ‘coloured’, as he would say, by 
rhythm; time suspended, in his slow movements, or time racing forwards, in 
his scherzos and dances, or, most frequently, time changing its rhythmic 
colour from moment to moment. Instead of affirming the orderly flow of 
everyday existence, this is music which acknowledges only two essences: the 
instantaneous and the eternal.’ (Griffiths 2006) 
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